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Abstract 
In many African countries south of the Sahara, farmers depend on the cultivation of vegetatively propagated crops 
(VPCs) for both consumption and commercial purposes. Yet yields for these crops remain at low levels due, in part, 
to seed market imperfections that constrain farmers’ access to improved varieties and high-quality planting material. 
Efforts to improve the quality of planting material exchanged in markets or through other channels are often 
hampered by the unique biological and economic characteristics of vegetative propagation—characteristics that 
distinguish VPCs from the major cereal crops that drive and shape the policy and investment choices made in many 
of these countries. This suggests that continued investment in new technologies and systems to produce, package, 
and distribute VPC planting materials will require customized policies and policy support if these systems are to 
supply farmers with quality planting material at any significant and sustained scale. This paper explores these issues 
in the context of the cassava seed system in Nigeria by drawing on (1) prior research, public policy documents, and 
government statistics; (2) key informant interviews and focus group discussions with seed system actors; and (3) a 
unique dataset from the 2015 Cassava Monitoring Survey of Nigeria (CMS). The paper examines the production and 
supply of cassava planting material, the influence of various quality assurance systems on production and supply, 
and the implications for smallholder farmers in Nigeria. We describe the market, non-market, and regulatory systems 
that shape the cassava seed market in Nigeria, focusing on effectiveness, influence, and reach. We then explore the 
ground realities—how farmers actually acquire and use cassava planting material—given the (weak) state of markets 
and regulation. This is followed by a discussion of alternative policy and regulatory approaches to managing and 
expanding the cassava seed system, emphasizing a more decentralized approach that prioritizes investment in 
innovative capacity at the community and enterprise levels.  
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The cassava seed system in Nigeria: 




Vegetatively propagated crops—roots, tubers, and bananas—are central to both agricultural production systems 
and consumption choices throughout much of Africa south of the Sahara. Africa is the world’s largest producer of 
two important vegetatively propagated crops (VPCs): cassava and yam, accounting for about 54 percent and 96 
percent of global production, respectively. Other VPCs such as potato, sweetpotato, banana, and plantain are also 
key food security crops in the continent. But yields for these crops in Africa lag well behind global averages. A well-
established path towards yield improvement is increasing the availability of improved genetic traits and quality 
planting material for VPCs (Almekinders et al., 2019; Andrade-Piedra et al., 2016; Jeffery et al., 2020). Yet seed 
systems and markets for VPCs in many African countries south of the Sahara face many challenges, contributing to 
low use-rates of improved varieties and quality seed, low yields, and low yield growth rates relative to other 
countries.1  
The low productivity of VPCs in Africa is partly attributed to market imperfections that constrain farmers’ access to 
improved varieties (Bold et al., 2017; Wossen et al. 2019a). But even when improved varieties are available, limited 
access to high-quality seed (i.e., planting materials that are superior in physical, physiological and health quality, 
irrespective of genetics), is often a serious constraint (Almekinders et al., 2019). There are several well-established 
explanations for these market imperfections that resonate with VPCs throughout the world (Fuglie et al., 2006). First 
and foremost, VPC seed is often bulky, perishable, costly to store, highly susceptible to pests and diseases, and 
difficult to certify (Kapinga, 2013; Gibson et al. 2009). These characteristics constrain the time and space over which 
seed can be exchanged, as well as the feasible sizes of the exchanges.  
Second, VPCs are typically exchanged in markets that embody many of the classic failures observed in other seed 
markets: asymmetric information between seller (who may know the genetic and physical potential of the seed 
product) and farmer (who cannot assess quality prior to cultivation) (Jack, 2011); and non-appropriability of the gains 
from innovation (i.e., breeding and crop improvement) (Kloppenburg, 2010; Spielman & Ma, 2016). Third, returns 
to the use of quality VPC seed are often low and variable in low-input and nominally commercialized production 
systems, which is often the reality of smallholders throughout much of Africa. To provide a sense of scale, consider 
the fact that while the yield gains associated with replacing low-quality or adulterated hybrid maize seed with 
authentic, first-generation (F1) hybrid seed in Uganda can reach 80 percent (Bold et al., 2017), similar replacement 
 
1 Throughout this paper, we refer to “seed systems” as a generic phrase to describe any system in which planting material is produced, exchanges, 
and used. This system covers true biological seed as well as asexually, clonally, or vegetatively propagated materials such as cuttings and buddings. 
In the case of cassava, “seed” as used in this paper refers specifically to stems, which are the primary form of planting material for cassava. 
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of stems for disease-resistant cassava varieties in neighboring Tanzania reach between 8 and 20 percent (MEDA, 
2016).2  
Finally, VPC seed production is often uneconomical in many situations. Low seed multiplication rates plus the costs 
of storage and losses in storage result in high costs of seed production for VPCs relative to most cereal crops 
(Kapinga, 2013; Almekinders et al., 2019). Combined with the perishability and bulkiness problems mentioned 
earlier, plus the availability of viable substitutes in the form of farmer-saved seed, VPC seed production is a 
challenging business proposition even for the best entrepreneur.  
In the presence of such market failures, farmers often utilize the information available in local markets to form 
subjective beliefs about quality. However, farmers may misperceive quality when such information reveals quality 
inaccurately, thus limiting their ability to use high-quality seed effectively. When quality is difficult to observe in 
market exchanges, government intervention can be used to address the underlying market failure and improve 
overall market efficiency. Such interventions may include public investment in R&D to make up for the absence of 
private innovation incentives; regulatory systems that impose quality standards on seed traded in formal markets; 
or subsidy and tax incentives to lower the costs of seed production and stimulate demand for quality seed. 
Considerable evidence on remedies to market imperfections exists in the literature (e.g., Spielman and Smale, 2017; 
Pal and Tripp, 2002; Tripp and Rohrbach, 2001; Morris, 1998; Tripp, 1997; Tripp and Louwaars, 1997). However, such 
studies generally focus on major cereal crops—rice, wheat, and especially maize—where issues of quality, costs, and 
returns are less acute for both seed producers and farmers. 
Against this backdrop, this paper attempts to highlight the importance of not only genetic improvement, but also 
the importance of developing more functional and sustainable seed systems and markets that account for the 
uniqueness of VPCs. We explore the cassava seed system in Nigeria to illustrate this point. Nigeria is the world’s 
largest producer of cassava, accounting for roughly 20 percent of the global cassava production. Yet cassava yields 
in the country range between 11 and 14 tonnes per hectare, far below the global average, and only a third of the 
yields achieved by other major cassava-producing countries such as Thailand and Vietnam (FAOSTAT, 2016; Wossen 
et al., 2019a). Cassava seed quality—the quality of the stems used as planting material—can significantly affect both 
the yield and quality of the tuberous cassava roots that is ultimately produced, consumed, and sold (MEDA, 2016). 3 
Yet recycled stems are used widely among Nigerian cassava farmers, contributing to the transmission of seed-borne 
pests and diseases from one generation to the next that ultimately affect yields (Kapinga, 2013; Rabbi et al., 2015; 
Gibson et al. 2009).  
This paper attempts to address the following three questions with illustrations from Nigeria’s cassava seed system. 
First, what are the public policies and regulations that govern a cassava seed system, and how do these policies and 
regulations influence the availability and affordability of quality seed? Second, what types of quality assurance 
regimes and mechanisms might be effective in increasing the supply of quality seed at scale in a sustained and cost-
effective manner? Third, what types of public policies and regulations might help advance the introduction of these 
quality assurance mechanisms on a sustained basis? We examine the above issues drawing on key informant 
 
2 Planting stems infected by cassava brown streak disease (CBSD) may result in a significant yield reduction. 
3 In Tanzania, MEDA(2016) reported a yield gain of 8% by using Mumba sourced from certified cassava seed and 20% gain by using Kiroba sourced 
from certified seed as compared to the same varieties sourced locally from farmers.  
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interviews (KIIs) and focus group discussions (FGDs) with seed system actors, data from a nationally representative 
household survey, and prior research studies, public policy documents, and government statistics. 
Cassava in Nigeria offers a useful contrast to the prevailing narratives on cereal seed systems in Africa not least 
because Nigeria is host to a poorly functional VPC seed system within an economy that is significantly fueled by 
cassava, and is in search of new and innovative solutions to problems facing the crop’s cultivation and use. Cassava 
represents the largest crop by area and production volume in Nigeria. The crop is largely produced by farm 
households as a staple food crop and is fast becoming a major source of cash income as well as an important 
contributor to agro-industrial development (Dixon et al., 2011; Alene et al., 2012; Wossen et al., 2017b). Despite the 
importance of the crop for livelihood, the seed system remains largely informal throughout Nigeria due partly to the 
intrinsic characteristics described earlier, and in part due to public under-investment in innovative production, 
marketing, and quality control mechanisms. For instance, while about 60 percent of farmers in Nigeria cultivate 
improved cassava varieties, almost all rely on the informal system (i.e., own-saved stems, and exchange with friends, 
relatives, or neighbors) to obtain planting material for improved varieties (Wossen et al. 2017a). 
Our key findings are summarized as follows. Although there are well established legal and regulatory frameworks 
governing the cassava seed system in Nigeria, the existing system mandating seed certification is more stringent 
than warranted. Quality assurance standards are not consistently adhered to in the inspection process; inspections 
are mostly visual, with little or no field sample collection or laboratory testing; and the inspection regime covers an 
infinitesimally small share of the overall exchange of cassava seed exchanges. The existing certification system is also 
prohibitively costly to implement, monitor, and enforce at any reasonably effective scale. In addition, previous public 
investments in breeding for host resistance and distributing improved varieties on a massive scale were conducted 
without commensurate investments in building quality assurance capacity. This has further weakened the reach and 
credibility of the legal and regulatory frameworks, further constraining implementation, monitoring, and 
enforcement. In the simplest terms, no certification may be better than ineffective certification, in terms of 
accelerating varietal turnover, improving the availability of quality stems and providing profitable opportunities to 
seed producers. 
Further, our findings suggest that efforts to increase access to improved varieties and accelerate varietal turnover 
might be a more viable investment option than improving access to quality cassava seed for varieties that farmers 
already plant, given the low adoption rate of improved varieties and slow varietal turnover rate in the country. In 
terms of regulatory reforms, we propose a low-cost, decentralized quality assurance system that relies on the 
multiplication and distribution of clean stems by village and individual seed entrepreneurs with mandatory starter 
stem replacement schedules and stewardship for trueness to type. This “light-touch” system may be more effective 
in accelerating varietal turnover and improving the availability of quality stems relative to the existing quality 
assurance system. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an analytical framework on quality assurance 
and the supply of quality seed. Section 3 describes the data and data sources used in the analysis. Section 4 provides 
an overview of the cassava seed system of Nigeria, drawing on our data and focusing on key seed system actors and 
the legal and regulatory frameworks under which they operate. Section 5 discusses the main findings, followed by a 
discussion of policy and regulatory reform options for Nigeria’s cassava seed system in Section 6. Section 7 concludes 
with summary reflections and policy recommendations. 
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2. QUALITY SEED EXCHANGES IN THE PRESENCE OF MARKET AND 
REGULATORY FRICTIONS 
In this section, we develop an analytical framework to demonstrate how the level and type of quality assurance 
system, public investment in the mass distribution of improved varieties, and breeding for host-resistant varieties 
affect the demand and supply of quality stems. We then explore alternative quality assurance mechanisms that 
might be more effective in increasing access and availability of quality stems to farmers.  
2.1  QUALITY ASSURANCE AND SUPPLY OF QUALITY STEMS  
We begin by considering the level and type of quality assurance, on the one hand, and the supply of quality seed, as 
an inherent trade-off in any given seed system. Following Auriol and Schilizzi (2015), Li and Veld (2015), and Fischer 
and Lyon (2019), our analytical framework builds on the experience or credence nature of seed quality, i.e., seed 
buyers can only learn about its quality after purchasing and planting it.4 We start by considering the behavior of the 
three key actors in the market: regulators, seed producers, and seed consumers (i.e., farmers). All else being equal, 
seed producers maximize profit from the sale of quality seed, seed consumers maximize utility from the use of 
quality seed, and regulators maximize public welfare, i.e., minimizing pest and disease pressure. We denote the 
quality of cassava stems as 𝜃𝑛 .  
Quality is vertically differentiated such that higher-quality stems are always preferred to lower-quality stems at the 
same price. We define three levels of quality, differentiated by the quality assurance regime applied to their 
production.5 We define these regimes with respect to the application (or absence) of external and internal 
inspections of seed production and the resultant materials, i.e., stem quality. External inspections are officially 
sanctioned inspections conducted in reference to established quality standards, procedures, and protocols that are 
conducted by a public regulator or its designee. Internal inspections are based on positive selection practices and 
the seed producer’s own established authority, credibility, and capacity to assess quality, though this may be done 
without reference to established quality standards, procedures, and protocols.  
We denote a “high” quality assurance regime as one that relies on the application of (a) external inspections and (b) 
internal inspections. We denote a “light-touch” quality assurance regime as one that does not rely on (a) external 
inspections but does rely on (b) internal inspections. And we denote the absence of a quality assurance regime as 
the state in which neither (a) external inspections nor (b) internal inspections are conducted, i.e., the application of 
traditional or conventional practice only.6  
This translates directly into three levels of seed quality (𝜃𝑛): high-quality seed (𝜃𝐻); medium-quality seed (𝜃𝑀); and 
ordinary farmer saved seed (𝜃). Alternatively, we can define these three stems as (a) certified seed, which is a class 
of seed that meets the minimum official certification requirements for genetic purity, thresholds for physiological 
 
4 Note that the term “purchasing” does not imply that exchanges of seed take place only in formal markets where transactions are conducted in 
cash. It is equally feasible for exchanges to take place as bartering or gifting between family members, neighbors, traders, or other seed system 
actors. This does not affect the insights derived from this analytical framework. 
5 See Gildemacher et al. (2017) for more on external and internal seed quality assurance mechanisms for VPCs. 
6 Of course, we acknowledge that traditional or conventional farmer practices—including the use of indigenous knowledge—applied to farmer 
selection and production of cassava planting may result in higher-quality stems than the other categories described here. We introduce this 
ranking only for convenience, noting that results remain consistent with alternative definitions of quality level and quality assurance system. 
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and health attributes; (b) uncertified clean seed, which is, notionally, an alternative class of seed that may meet 
some thresholds for genetic purity as well as physiological and health attributes, but does not fulfil the minimum 
requirements for official certification; and (c) ordinary farmer saved seed, which does not meet any requirements. 
Although the threats of pest and disease are higher for uncertified clean seed relative to certified seed, it does 
potentially reduce such threats compared to ordinary farmer saved seeds. Irrespective of the definitions chosen, we 
order quality such that 𝜃𝐻 ≥  𝜃𝑀 >  𝜃.   
2.1.1  SEED DEMAND  
Demand for quality seed originates from 𝑁 seed buyers, i.e., mostly cassava farmers. On the demand side of this 
hypothetical seed market, farmers’ demand for quality seed is, all else being equal, a function of their preferences 
for quality ( 𝜓𝑖). Specifically, 𝜓𝑖  represents farmers’ heterogeneous preferences for quality and implicitly measures 
their willingness to pay (WTP). Since seed is a key input to the crop production process, we assume the following 
relationship to hold: 
𝜕𝜃𝑛
𝜕𝜓𝑖
> 0. This implies that farmers’ decision to acquire high-quality seed is an increasing function 
of their marginal utility for quality. Let the private benefit farmers derive from the use of quality stem and the 
corresponding price premium they are willing to pay be 𝑓(𝜃𝑛) and 𝑝𝑛, respectively. In our context, 𝑓(𝜃𝑛) can be 
interpreted as the yield gains associated with quality seed relative to 𝜃. Demand for stem quality, implicitly the 
stringency of quality standards, is represented by the following utility function:  
 𝒲𝑛 =  𝜓𝑖𝑓(𝜃
𝑛) − 𝑝𝑛 1  
The incentive compatibility condition for seed buyers, i.e., the condition that makes them indifferent between 
acquiring 𝜃𝐻 or 𝜃𝑀; and 𝜃𝑀 or 𝜃, respectively is given by: 
 
𝜓𝑖[𝑓(𝜃
𝐻) − 𝑓(𝜃𝑀)] =  [𝑝𝐻 − 𝑝𝑀]  
 𝜓𝑖[𝑓(𝜃
𝑀)] =  [𝑝𝑀] 
2  
Equation (2) implies that farmers with a low (high) preference for quality acquire 𝜃𝑀(𝜃𝐻), respectively. Figure 1 
portrays demand for seed based on the above incentive compatibility condition. Along the WTP scale, demand for 
quality seed is zero (i.e., only 𝜃 seed types are demanded) when 𝑓(𝜃𝑀) < 𝑝𝑀. When 𝜓𝑖([𝑓(𝜃
𝐻) − 𝑓(𝜃𝑀)] (≤
) [𝑝𝐻 − 𝑝𝑀] ≥  𝑝𝑀  farmers demand 𝜃𝑀. Finally, in the 𝐷𝐻  region, only 𝜃𝐻 will be demanded by farmers. 
 
Figure 1: Demand (WTP) for quality seed 
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2.1.2 SEED SUPPLY 
On the supply side, we consider a market with 𝑁 seed producers. Following Li and Veld (2015), quality is explicitly 
incorporated in the cost of seed production. Let the quality specific cost of seed production and the cost of external 
inspections be 𝛼 and 𝜙, respectively. Hence the quality-specific cost of production is represented as:  
 𝒞(𝜃𝑛) = (𝛼)𝜃𝑛 + 𝜙 3  
Given the above cost structures, the seed producer obtains the following quality specific unit profit (𝜋𝑛): 
 𝜋𝑛 = 𝑝𝑛 − (𝛼)𝜃𝑛 − 𝜙   4  
The incentive compatibility condition for seed producers imply a non-negative profit, 𝜋𝑛 ≥ 0. 
2.1.3 EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS 
At the equilibrium, demand equals supply. Hence, by combining equation (1) and equation (3), the optimal quality 
and price premium becomes: 
  𝜓𝑖𝑓(𝜃
𝑛) = 𝑝𝑛 →  𝜓𝑖𝑓(𝜃
𝑛) − (𝛼)𝜃𝑛 − 𝜙 = 0 5  
The above condition implies that at the equilibrium, the quality-specific marginal benefit must be equal to the price 
premium paid by buyers. However, in the presence of imperfect/weak regulatory capacity to monitor and enforce 
quality standards, seed buyers are unlikely to pay a premium (i.e., 𝑝𝑛). In this case, the corner solution would always 
be supplying 𝜃, everyone uses the minimum quality stem that can be grown (this is the classic lemon-market problem 
described by Ackerlof 1970).  
2.2  ACCOUNTING FOR UNOBSERVABLE QUALITY  
When quality is not observable, the quality assurance regime and the credibility of the signal emitted from that 
regime influences seed demand, supply, and ultimately, the structure of the seed system and market. Following 
Starbird (2005), we address the role of quality assurance and quality signaling by focusing on external and internal 
seed inspection regimes described above and by Gildemacher et al. (2017). Suppose that the minimum quality 
threshold set by a regulator is 𝜃. For now, we consider a quality assurance regime that only allows for the production 
and sale of high-quality seed (𝜃𝐻). Given the different levels of seed quality introduced above, let 𝑝𝐻 and 𝑝𝑀  denote 
the price premium paid by seed buyers for 𝜃𝐻 and 𝜃𝑀 quality levels. Let 𝜔 denote the probability of passing external 
inspection for non-𝜃𝐻 seed producers at the quality threshold level of 𝜃. Since quality is vertically differentiated, 
𝜃𝐻 ≥  𝜃𝑀, high-quality seed producers will have at least 𝜔 probability of passing external inspection and hence 
𝑝𝑀 = 𝜔𝑝𝐻 . Since 𝜃 is ordinary recycled seed from own production, neither external nor internal inspection apply. 
Given a non-zero probability of rejection, the incentive compatibility condition of seed producers, i.e., making the 
seed entrepreneur indifferent between producing and supplying 𝜃𝐻 and 𝜃𝑀 in the market is given by: 
 
𝑝𝐻 − (𝛼)𝜃𝐻 − 𝜙 ≥ 𝜔𝑝𝐻 − (𝛼)𝜃𝑀 
= [𝑝𝐻 − 𝜔𝑝𝐻] ≥ (𝛼)[𝜃𝐻 − 𝜃𝑀] + 𝜙   
6  
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Quality assurance through inspection will only be informative if 𝜔 is very small/zero at or above 𝜃. If 𝑝𝐻 − 𝜔𝑝𝐻 =
0 at or above 𝜃, quality assurance through inspection is uninformative as medium-quality seed have at least the 
same chance of passing inspection as high-quality stems. In this case, the informativeness of the quality assurance 
regime can be improved by investing in inspection capacity. If 𝑝𝐻 − 𝜔𝑝𝐻 = 0 below 𝜃, increasing the minimum 
quality standard will improve the informativeness of the quality assurance process (the single-binary standard region 
in Figure 2). The above insights imply that the accuracy or precision of the inspection process determines the quality 
of seed supplied to the market.  
Moreover, regulation may also introduce a quality-quantity trade-off in the market for seed. For example, an 
exceedingly high minimum quality standard may pose a barrier to entry for prospective seed producers that, in turn, 
creates the conditions for a highly concentrated or monopolistic structure in the market for high-quality seed, 
resulting in a lower quantity of 𝜃𝐻 seed supplied to the market at a higher price or, in the extreme, no entry of seed 
producers and thus no quantity of 𝜃𝐻 seed in the market at any price. Alternatively, a weak or absent quality 
assurance regime in a market where product quality is unobservable at the point of exchange may cause producers 
of lower-quality seed (𝜃𝑀 , 𝜃)  to crowd into the market, driving out high-quality 𝜃𝐻 seed in an illustration of the 
classic “lemons” market (Akerlof, 1970).  
 
Co-existence of quality levels  
What then would be the first-best quality assurance regime under which an optimal quantity and quality of seed is 
supplied to the market? In other words, what level of regulation overcomes the quality-quantity trade-off described 
above? Figure 2 illustrates the trade-off between the level of regulation and the supply of quality seed, with 𝜃∗  
denoting the optimal quality threshold to be set by a regulator. Moving along the x-axis to the left from 𝜃∗ toward 
or past 𝜃0, the quality threshold is increasingly lower, leading to an increasingly lower quantity of high-quality 𝜃𝐻 
seed in the market. In this case, increasing the minimum quality standard to a more ambitious level will improve the 
overall supply of 𝜃𝐻 seed in the market. Moving along the x-axis to the right from 𝜃∗ toward or past 𝜃1, the quality 
threshold is increasingly higher, again leading to an increasingly lower quantity of high-quality 𝜃𝐻 seed in the market. 
In this case, introducing a lower quality standard through a graded labelling system will allow for the co-existence of 
different quality levels, resulting in higher supply of quality seed in the market.  
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Instead of a strict quality assurance regime, consider the solutions obtained from a less stringent regime that still 
supplies some level and quantity of quality seed 𝜃𝑀 >  𝜃 to the market Let 𝜃𝐻 and 𝜃𝑀 denote the minimum quality 
standards for high-quality and medium-quality seed producers, respectively. Also, let 𝑞𝐻and 𝑞𝑀 denote the 
respective market shares of high-quality and medium-quality seed producers. An equilibrium which makes seed 
producers indifferent to adopt 𝜃𝐻 or 𝜃𝑀 seed types is given by: 
 𝑝𝐻 − 𝑝𝑀 = (𝛼)𝜃𝐻 − (𝛼)𝜃𝑀 + 𝜙 7  
The above relationship suggests that the overall market share of certified seed (i.e., price premium) and the cost of 
quality assurance determines the welfare-maximizing standards. Hence, introducing graded standards instead of a 
single-binary standard allows for the coexistence of multiple seed quality levels (𝜃𝐻 , 𝜃𝑀) and provides an explicit 
channel for quality seed production and replacement (if managed properly), and reduces the costs of a quality 
assurance regime that are otherwise prohibitive. The optimality of this approach depends on the trade-offs between 
(a) yield loss/changes in private benefits due to quality degeneration (i.e., 𝑓(𝜃𝐻) − 𝑓(𝜃𝑀), (b) cost savings from 
reliance only on internal inspection rather than external inspection (i.e., 𝜙), (c) the price premium that buyers would 
be willing to offer (𝑝𝐻 − 𝑝𝐻)~𝜙, and (d) a practical recognition that a stringent regime is prohibitively costly to 
implement, monitor, and enforce. 
Following Li and Veld (2015) and Zilberman et al. (2018), we illustrate the welfare implications of a graded labelling 
system in Figure 3. The green line denotes the demand for high-quality seed while the blue line represents the 
demand for medium-quality seeds.7 As discussed above, in the absence of a quality assurance regime, the price 
premium approaches to zero (𝑝0) and only 𝜃 quality is supplied, resulting in a market for lemons. 
 
Figure 3: Welfare implication of a graded labeling system 
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Next, consider a quality assurance regime that only allows for the production and sale of high-quality seed and 
forbids the production of 𝜃𝑀 seed. Since such regulation introduces a barrier to entry, it creates the opportunity for 
non-competitive market behavior described above. Under this scenario, the price premium ranges from 𝑝0 to 𝑝𝐻, 
depending on farmers heterogenous preferences for quality (𝜓𝑖) which determines their WTP. As shown in Figure 
3, the welfare gains to farmers who are willing to pay above 𝑝0 is denoted by the area 𝑝0𝑞𝐻𝑝𝐻. However, by 
recognizing the production of 𝜃𝑀 through a graded labeling system, the overall supply of quality seed can be 
increased to 𝑞𝑀, generating welfare given by the area 𝑝0𝑝𝑀𝑞𝑀. Hence, by failing to recognize 𝜃𝑀, the welfare loss 
of those with a willingness to pay between 𝑝0 and 𝑝𝐻 is denoted by area 𝑝𝑀𝑝0𝑞𝑀 − 𝑞𝐻𝑝𝐻𝑝0 = 𝐵𝑞𝐻𝑞𝑀 − 𝐴𝑝𝑀𝑝𝐻 >
0. 
2.3  QUALITY ASSURANCE AND BREEDING FOR HOST RESISTANCE  
Finally, we account for breeding for host resistance in our characterization of the market for seed. For many VPCs 
(and, indeed, all crops), breeding for pest or disease resistance provides a near-perfect substitute for quality (pest- 
and disease-free) seed, although this may not fully address soil- and seed-borne pathogens and or disease vectors 
such as insects, which require, inter alia, better crop management practices. The breeding-for-host-resistance 
approach is analogous to internalizing the minimum quality threshold (𝜃0) into the variety itself. The availability of 
pest- or disease-resistant varieties directly affects the cost incurred to meet the minimum quality threshold as well 
as the supply of quality seed. At any quality threshold 𝜃, the cost of quality assurance for disease-resistant varieties 
(𝓡) is expected to be lower than non-resistant varieties (𝓝). Specifically, although certain fixed costs such as 
inspection fees and record-keeping may not vary by variety, the inputs, labor, and management required to produce 
pest- and disease-free seed of disease-resistant varieties are likely to be lower than non-resistant varieties. 
Moreover, since disease-resistant varieties are bred to withstand biotic pressures, they are likely to achieve higher 
multiplication rates in seed production and degenerate more slowly than non-resistant varieties, thereby reducing 
the per-unit cost of seed production.  
Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between regulatory costs quality thresholds (𝜃1 for low, 𝜃∗ for optimal, and 𝜃1 
for high-quality thresholds, respectively) and the size of the market for quality seed. The optimal regulation level for 
resistant and non-resistant varieties is shown at points 𝑅∗ and 𝑁∗, respectively. Any quality threshold (𝜃) set higher 
than 𝜃∗ results in a reduction in the supply of quality seed for non-resistant varieties but is meaningless in increasing 
or reducing the supply of quality seed for disease-resistant varieties. This is because any quality threshold (𝜃) set 
higher than 𝜃∗ is unlikely to increase the marginal cost of quality for disease-resistant varieties. Since, maximum 
quality can be achieved at point 𝑁∗, seed producers are able to comply with any level of 𝜃 set higher than 𝜃∗ without 
incurring additional costs. This is analogous to a “tariff on water” or a “binding overhang” that captures the extent 
to which the applied quality threshold by regulators exceeds the required quality threshold. As such, reducing the 
quality threshold from 𝜃1 to 𝜃0 increases the overall supply of quality seed of disease-resistant varieties. 
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Figure 4: Quality assurance for disease-resistant varieties 
2.4  PRODUCER AND CONSUMER SUBSIDIES 
So what might the cassava seed system with a graded labeling regulation actually look like? The answer to that 
question depends acutely on the strategic use of producer and consumer subsidies as a second-best solution to 
inherent failures (or, more appropriately, the inherent frictions) in the cassava seed market and the regulatory 
system designed to address those failures. At the highest level, strong external and internal inspections are applied 
to the production of high-quality 𝜃𝐻 seed at quantities required to replace seed used as an input by producers of 
medium-quality 𝜃𝑀 ≡ 𝛾𝜃𝐻 seed at a rate commensurate with the rate of quality degeneration or in response to 
emergent pest and disease threats. While marginal production costs of this high-quality seed may exceed the 
willingness to pay for 𝜃𝐻  among farmers, this price is likely to be closer to the willingness to pay of 𝜃𝑀 seed, and can 
be further reduced with strategic public investment in land and capital. Medium quality (𝜃𝑀) seed producers, in 
turn, receive public support in the form of producer subsidies. Such subsidies can take the form of technical advice 
and training on quality seed production, internal inspection practices, and marketing; or may take the form of 
subsidized credit or preferential, low-cost access to early generation materials from research centers, land, and 
irrigation equipment for seed production, or other inputs to production. These seed producers then supply medium-
quality seed at prices that are likely to be closer to the willingness to pay of farmers themselves, thereby reducing 
the share of farmers relying on ordinary recycled seed (𝜃) that has been retained beyond recommended durations. 
Consumer subsidies at this point in the system may take the form of free or low-cost seed provision, extension and 
advisory services, or subsidized complementary inputs such as fertilizer. 
Ultimately, the economic feasibility of strategic public investments—including both public spending on research and 
extension and producer and consumer subsidies—required to reduce market and regulatory frictions requires a keen 
understanding of the long-term costs and benefits involved (Jayne and Rashid, 2013; Jayne et al., 2018). While 
strategic public investments in agriculture and agricultural subsidy programs are a potential means of kick-starting 
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cassava seed markets and improving cassava yields and profitability, they are not benign uses of scarce public 
resources. Rather, they are the subject of politics as much as they are of economics, necessitating careful analysis of 
the political economy factors that drive their design and application (see, e.g., Resnick, 2012; Jerven, 2014; Mason 
et al., 2017).  
Still, the conceptual framework provided above formalizes our understanding of the trade-offs involved by different 
quality assurance regimes for seed—particularly VPC planting material—and their implications for market size and 
value, producer and farmer welfare, and market structure. This opens the door to some difficult questions about 
what type of quality assurance system is most appropriate to the situations where regulators have limited capacity 
to implement, monitor, or enforce quality assurance regimes and external inspections effectively; and where seed 
producers themselves have limited capacity to conduct internal inspections or signal seed quality in the market 
effectively. We examine these issues in the context of Nigeria’s seed system in the next section.  
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3. DATA AND DATA SOURCES 
We draw on data from three distinct sources: (1) secondary data and analysis, including prior research studies, public 
policy documents, government statistics, and project documents; (2) key informant interviews and focus group 
discussions; and (3) the 2015/16 Cassava Monitoring Survey of Nigeria (Wossen et al., 2017a). Each is described in 
detail below. 
Secondary data and analysis on Nigeria’s cassava seed system is relatively limited. Although a relatively large body 
of work exists on the correlates of the adoption of improved cassava varieties (Alene et al., 2012; Abdoulaye et al., 
2014; Awotide et al., 2015), few studies directly address the structure and performance of the seed system itself. 
Studies such as USAID (2016) and Kuhlmann et al. (2018) attempt to address some of the salient features of the 
cassava seed system in Nigeria, focusing on regional harmonization of seed system regulations and the production 
and distribution of early generation seed, respectively. We draw on the insights provided from these studies to 
contextualize and validate our own findings, analysis, and recommendations. For similar purposes, we draw on 
government documents including national agriculture sector development strategies, cassava sector development 
strategies, and seed regulatory directives, statutes, rules, guidelines, and standards. Finally, we used secondary 
sources such as the government’s own economic and agricultural statistics, and project descriptions from 
development partners, international development organizations, and non-governmental organizations to provide 
further descriptive insights into Nigeria’s cassava seed system. 
The second data source is a series of KIIs and FGDs conducted with seed systems actors. The KIIs and FGDs were 
conducted between June and December 2017 in Nigeria using semi-structured interview guides that were developed 
for each category of actor as part of a larger project on seed systems and markets for VPCs.8 The interview guides 
covered topics that ranged from seed production, marketing, and distribution to the regulations and guidelines that 
govern seed inspection, certification, and trade.  
 
8 Data collection using KIIs and FGDs was done under the auspices of a cross-country study conducted by IFPRI, CIP, IITA, and CIAT, and supported 
by the CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions and Markets (PIM) and the CGIAR Research Program on Roots, Tubers and Bananas (RTB). 
Individuals recruited for participation in the KIIs and FGDs described above were introduced to the study through a spoken script to obtain their 
verbal consent to participate in the interview. The study was approved by the IFPRI Institutional Review Board (IRB application no. 2017-06-06; 
IRB no. 00007490; FWA no. 00005121). Survey materials are accessible online at: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/MSIMRE. 
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Table 1: Actors, locations, and number of individuals interviewed 
  No. of 
Actor category Location Organizations Individuals 
Policymakers, advisors, and 
regulators 
Abuja, Ibadan, Nasarawa, Oyo 4 28 
Public research agencies, 
institutes, centers, and stations 
Abuja, Ibadan, Kaduna, Nasarawa, 
Niger, Ogun, Oyo, Umudike 
5 22 
Public extension services and 
development programs 
Abuja, Ibadan, Kaduna, Nasarawa, 
Niger, Ogun, Oyo 
2 35 
Individual and small-scale seed 
entrepreneurs 
Abuja, Ibadan, Kaduna, Nasarawa, 
Niger, Ogun, Oyo 
41 41 
Total 52 126 
Source: Authors 
Where just one or several participants were present, discussions were conducted as KIIs; where multiple participants 
were present, they were conducted as FGDs. The difference pertains primarily to how the discussion was managed 
and how information was presented, discussed, validated, refuted, and revised by participants and the interviewer, 
with FGDs often allowing for more iterative processes and KIIs allowing for greater depth of inquiry on specific topics. 
A total of 126 individuals were interviewed through the KII or FGD format (Table 1).  
The third data source is the 2015 Cassava Monitoring Survey (CMS) of Nigeria (Wossen et al., 2017a).9 CMS is a 
nationally representative survey that contains information about cassava production from 16 major cassava 
producing states of the country (Fig. 5). Specifically, the CMS provides data on varietal choice and turnover, source 
of planting material, stem recycling practices, trait preferences, yield, and other key socioeconomic characteristics 
from a nationally representative sample of approximately 2500 cassava growers in Nigeria. 
 
9 The full CMS report is available online here: https://cgspace.cgiar.org/handle/10568/80706  
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Figure 5: Study area for the Cassava Monitoring Survey of Nigeria 
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4. A BRIEF HISTORY OF NIGERIA’S CASSAVA SEED SECTOR 
4.1.  CASSAVA PRODUCTION IN NIGERIA 
Cassava figures significantly in Nigeria’s economy. It is produced by smallholder farm households in many parts of 
the country and provides an important source of income and nutrition for farmers and consumers alike (Alene et al., 
2012; Wossen et al., 2017b). Due to its resilience to drought and its adaptability to a range of agro-climatic and soil 
conditions, it is viewed as a traditional food security crop, a principal crop in farm diversification strategies, and an 
essential input to Nigeria’s growing agri-food system. According to data from the 2015 Cassava Monitoring Survey, 
about 53 percent of the cassava production in Nigeria is marketed while 38 percent is used for home consumption 
in the form of fresh roots or processed products such as garri and fufu (Wossen et al., 2017a). The remaining 9 
percent is used for feed and industrial purposes such as starch, alcohol, and ethanol production. CMS data also 
suggest that more than 30 percent of cassava farmers derive about 75 percent of their income from cassava (Wossen 
et al., 2017a).  
Given its importance to the economy, the Government of Nigeria has prioritized cassava in its R&D investment and 
agricultural development strategies. Since 1984, more than 46 improved cassava varieties have been released and 
disseminated to farmers, yet adoption rates of these improved varieties are still relatively low. For instance, while 
approximately 60 percent of the farmers in Nigeria report that they are cultivating improved cassava varieties, only 
38 percent of the cassava-cultivated area is under improved varieties (Wossen et al., 2017a; Thiele et al., 2020). Not 
surprisingly, cassava yields in the country are only about 10.6 t/ha, far below the global average, and only a third of 
yields in other major cassava producing countries such as Thailand (FAOSTAT, 2016). 
 
Figure 6: Comparison of cassava yields 
Source: FAO, 2016 
Data from the CMS also suggest that few farmers had access to improved varieties prior to the 2000s, when 
significant public investments and initiatives were made to multiply and disseminate improved varieties to farmers. 
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However, most of those who did adopt improved varieties are still growing varieties that were released almost 30 
years ago. To provide a broader perspective on varietal turnover, we estimate the weighted average varietal age 
(WAVA) of improved cassava varieties from the CMS data following the approach of Brennan and Byerlee (1991) and 
using the area under cultivation by variety as weights, where 
 𝑊𝐴𝑉𝐴 = ∑ 𝑇𝑖 𝑝𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 8  
where T is the time period (in years) since variety 𝑖 was released (calculated as 2016 minus the year of release); and 
𝑝 is the proportion of area allocated to variety 𝑖. In the CMS sample, the area-weighted average age of improved 
varieties is about 22 years. This result suggests that, on average, it takes about 22 years for a given variety to be 
replaced by another variety. 
Almost all cassava-cultivating farmers rely on the informal system to obtain planting material. According to the CMS 
data, own-saved stems and stems obtained from friends, relatives, or neighbors are the primary sources of planting 
materials for about 70 percent of all cassava farmers (Wossen et al. 2017a). And an additional 6 percent of farmers 
obtained stems from local markets. Only about 17 percent of farmers obtained cassava stems from semi-formal and 
formal sources such as government extension services, research institutions, and processors. Note that these latter 
sources do not necessarily indicate that such seed was certified. Farmers typically recycle their stems as seed. The 
CMS data indicate that only 6 percent of farmers replaced their planting material at an average rate of once every 
nine years and travel an average of just 3 km to do so (Wossen et al., 2017a).  
 
4.2  KEY ACTORS IN THE CASSAVA SEED SYSTEM  
The cassava seed system in Nigeria is a constellation of many actors, some of which interact in closely integrated 
sub-systems and others that move in distinct and separate orbits. In this sub-section, we examine the key actors in 
cassava research and variety development, regulation, early generation seed production, and stem distribution. The 
first row of Table 2 shows the key actors involved in the seed sector, including legally mandated actors for variety 
development, early generation and certified seed production to quality regulations. Focusing on cassava, the second 
row reports the key actors currently involved in variety development, early generation seed production, certified 
stem production as well as in the multiplication, distribution, and marketing of stems in the formal system.  
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Table 2: Roles of key stakeholders in the formal seed sector 
Key actors Variety 
development 


























































































Source: authors based on NESG (2020) 
As early as 1966—just six years after independence—the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources 
(FMANR) was mandated to promote seed industry development in Nigeria. But the introduction of the requisite 
policies and agencies took longer to develop, first with the establishment of the National Seed Service (NSS) within 
FMANR in 1975, which was mandated to manage the country’s nascent seed industry through various programs and 
projects. In 1987, the National Crop Varieties and Livestock Breeds Act was introduced and the National Crop 
Varieties and Livestock Breeds Registration and Release Committee (NVRC) was established to oversee the variety 
release and registration process (Decree no. 33 of 1987; Kuhlmann et al., 2018). However, only in 1992 did Nigeria 
enact a broader and more structured law governing the seed system: The National Agricultural Seed Act (Decree no. 
72 of 1992), which established the legal framework for a national seed system along with the key organizations 
required to govern and manage this system.10 Importantly, the law led to the creation of the National Agricultural 
Seed Council (NASC) under the Ministry, which was charged with implementing and coordinating the Seed Act’s 
implementation (USAID, 2016).  
The key objectives of NASC include: promoting and stimulating seed industry development, regulating and 
controlling the registration of released varieties, facilitating the production and marketing of high quality seed, 
protecting farmers from the sales of poor quality seeds and providing legal backing for official testing, certification, 
sales, importation, exportation and use of seed (NESG, 2020). To accelerate the implementation of the seed act, the 
 
10 Note that, this act was amended and is replaced by the new Seed Act 2019 since May 2020. This work was conducted before the Seed Act 2019 
was passed. In the 2019 seed act, basic details remain the same as the 1992 act. The major changes in the 2019 act include: recognition of 3rd 
party certification, increased penalties for counterfeiting, recognition of propagation materials as “seed” for certification of VPCs. 
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following departments were established within NASC: the National Seed Service Unit, the National Crop Variety 
Registration and Release Committee (NVRC), the Seeds Standards Committee, the Seed Industry and Skill 
Development Committee, and the Department of Training, Information, and Seed Extension.  
Two research institutes are largely responsible for cassava research and varietal development: the National Root 
Crops Research Institute (NRCRI) and the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA). NRCRI holds the 
national mandate for varietal development and breeding and works closely with IITA, which started its cassava 
breeding program in the early 1970s with a focus on developing improved varieties with multiple disease resistance 
and high yield potential. In 1977, IITA developed the first wave of cassava mosaic virus disease (CMD) and cassava 
bacterial blight resistant (CBB-resistant) Tropical Manihot Selection (TMS) varieties such as TMS 50395, TMS 63397, 
TMS 30555, TMS 4(2)1425, and TMS 30572 (Nweke et al., 2002). Another breakthrough in the breeding program 
was the pyramiding of new sources of resistance to CMD, identified from West African landraces, within the earlier 
TMS varieties, thereby providing greater and more durable resistance. This second generation of improved cassava 
germplasm ultimately combined enhanced CMD resistance with improved postharvest qualities, resistance to 
multiple pests and diseases, and wider agroecological adaptations (Nweke et al., 2002). NRCRI has been a key 
contributor to the development, testing, release and dissemination of these varieties, and has expanded its work 
considerably since the 2000s with the introduction of the Presidential Initiative on Cassava, described in detail below. 
Although the 1992 Act allows both the private and public sector actors to participate in the production of early 
generation seed (EGS), there is little private investment in cassava EGS production and marketing. This is not 
surprising given the issues of appropriability discussed earlier: there is very little profit potential for private EGS 
producers in the cassava market as it stands today. As a result, IITA and NRCRI are the primary producers of EGS for 
cassava in Nigeria. EGS production and distribution serve as their primary means of disseminating improved cassava 
varieties to other seed system actors. Recently, the private sector has also been encouraged into foundation seed 
production through donor-funded projects.  
In Nigeria, the National Centre for Genetic Resources and Biotechnology (NACGRAB) and the NVRC, are the main 
institutional bodies involved in seed variety release and registration. In particular, the Registrar of NVCR, who is the 
Director of NACGRAB, plays a key role in variety evaluation, release, and registration (Kuhlmann et al., 2018). The 
first step in variety release is an application for variety registration and release by individual breeders or research 
institutions to NACGRAB with the required documentation and fee. As per the 2016 NACGRAB guidelines on release 
and registration of new crop varieties, the NVRC along with the Registrar of  NACGRAB ensure that trials for 
distinctiveness, uniformity, and stability (DUS) and value for cultivation and use (VCU) are undertaken in 
collaboration with the appropriate national agricultural research institutes (NARIs) (Kuhlmann et al., 2018). For 
cassava, the responsible NARI is the National Root Crops Research Institute (NRCRI). Prior to variety release and 
registration, a crop variety is generally required to undergo a minimum of two years of on-farm testing to determine 
its adaptability to a particular agroecological zone. Data from DUS, VCU, and on-farm trials form the basis for 
reviewing and releasing new varieties by the NVRC. The Technical Sub-Committee on Crops of the NVRC plays a key 
role in the determination of superiority, homogeneity, distinctiveness, and stability of materials to be released; 
determination of guidelines for testing and describing new crop varieties; and establishment of a variety naming 
system and recommendation of names for new varieties to the NVRC (Kuhlmann et al., 2018). 
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As Nigeria’s main seed system regulator, NASC aims to ensure and improve the quality of seed distributed to farmers. 
In particular, NASC seeks to ensure that all seed producers and traders abide by the rules and regulations specified 
in the 1992 National Agricultural Seeds Act. This includes preventing the production and marketing of non-certified 
seed: §14(1) of the 1992 Act clearly states that all seed sold in the market by registered seed producers must be 
inspected and approved and that such certification applies to all seed classes. Inspections are of the field-to-bag 
type, covering all stages of production. Currently, NASC carries out quality tests at the National Seed Testing 
Laboratory located in NASC headquarters in Sheda, close to Abuja to verify moisture content, purity, germination, 
and other disease-related parameters specified in Table 3 (Kuhlmann et al., 2018).11 For instance, the existing cassava 
seed quality regulations for pests and diseases established in 2012 are listed in Table 3.  
Table 3: NASC standards for pest and disease-related parameters for cassava (2012) 
Parameter  Foundation seed (%) Certified seed (%) 
*CMD (mosaic) 10 20 
*CAD (Anthracnose) 10 20 
*CBB (bacterial blight) 10 20 
Scale insects  0 20 
CM (mealybug) 10 20 
CGM (green mite) 10 20 
* Thresholds for plants with mean severity exceeding 3 
Source: NASC (2016) 
Current standards cover foundation seed and certified seed categories. Standards for breeder seed category were 
not established as this particular seed class is authorized for production only by NRCRI and IITA. Specifically, the 
following three mandatory inspections are undertaken by NASC for cassava seed production. The first is a pre-
planting inspection to verify the source of planting material, verify land preparation and isolation distances, and 
assess the field’s history and related information. At this stage of inspection, NASC guidelines recommend a 
minimum isolation distance of 5 m from fields planted to other cassava varieties, and starter seed replacement after 
two generations for foundation seed and three generations for certified seed. The second inspection is conducted 
to assess the incidence of pest and diseases and in-field varietal purity. The third inspection is conducted to evaluate 
field quality parameters such as the presence of off-types and the incidence of pests and diseases. If the seed field 
passes inspection, NASC issues tags/labels upon application. The label contains information on germination and 
purity levels of the seed, the name of the supplier, plant species and variety, and information on lot number, class 
of seed, and weight.  
Currently, NASC follows a per-certification with an area layer inspection cost schedule of ₦1000 for 0‒5 ha, ₦2000 
for 6‒9 ha, and ₦5000 for 10 ha. This is a one-time inspection cost, and standard practice for certification requires 
three rounds of inspection. This per-hectare cost does not include transport and other inspection-related costs (for 
example, the cost of shipping samples to the laboratory), which are normally borne by the seed producer. This also 
does not include business registration fees, which are ₦50,000 for large-scale producers, ₦30,000 for medium-scale 
 
11 In the 2019 seed act; basic details remain the same, and changes proposed include: 3rd party certification, increased penalties, mention of 
propagation material to recognize certification of VPCs.  
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producers, ₦20,000 for small-scale producers, and ₦10,000 for cooperatives. Several key informants suggested that 
the combined cost of business registration and inspection fees increases the cost of stem production by up to 26 
percent. Not surprisingly, the 2018 annual report of NASC shows that the production of certified cassava seed 
accounts for less than 1 percent of the total area allocated for certified seed production in the country.12 
To encourage the production of early generation seed (EGS), NASC has approved the engagement of other 
organizations, including international centers such as IITA, universities, and the private sector since 2017. 
Considering these changes, NASC has embarked on a revision of quality assurance standards for cassava. A 
framework for this revision has been proposed, which is currently being revised by NASC for adoption for seed 
certification starting 2020 season. 
In addition to NASC, the National Agricultural Quarantine Service (NAQS) is also involved in enforcing phytosanitary 
standards on agricultural materials. The mandate of NAQS is to protect crops from emerging pests and diseases 
through the inspection of germplasm and planting material imported to the country and to ensure that exports meet 
international standards. NAQS operates UNIDO-accredited testing laboratories in Ibadan, Lagos, Kano, Port-
Harcourt, and Maiduguri, and uses other accredited labs. Officially, NAQS has a zero-tolerance policy for planting 
materials that illegally cross the border, and enforcement—the destruction of the material—is done at the owners’ 
expense. NAQS and NASC jointly facilitate international import or export of commercial seed, whereas NASC is solely 
responsible for seed produced for domestic use. Unofficially, according to key informants interviewed for our study, 
NAQS has limited capacity and resources to prevent the flow of material across Nigeria’s borders in both directions. 
For the most part, cassava stem production, multiplication, and distribution occur with limited reference to the 
varietal development, EGS production, or regulatory oversight described above. Cassava stems are distributed 
through the informal practices of farmers themselves, with very small quantities of stems moving through the formal 
seed multiplication system under the kind of regulatory oversight described above. At least four stylized—and often 
overlapping—seed systems exist in Nigeria: (a) farmer-to-farmer and farmer-saved seed; (b) exchanges in local 
markets; (c) public extension programs and projects of non-governmental organizations (NGOs); and (d) more 
formal, market-based exchanges through commercial channels. Conventional wisdom among key informants 
interviewed for this study suggests that stem replacement rates—the key to a successful cassava seed system—is 
lowest in the farmer-to-farmer/farmer-saved seed systems and in local market exchanges (systems a and b), and 
possibly higher within the distribution programs/projects and commercial channels (systems c and d). Yet these 
same informants suggest that the volumes of stems moving through the former two systems capture the lion’s share 
of the entire cassava seed market, while the latter two systems are a negligible fraction of that market.  
 
4.3  RECENT POLICY MOMENTS FOR THE CASSAVA SEED SYSTEM 
In recent years, the role that these actors play in Nigeria’s cassava seed system has been further shaped by several 
important policy moments (see, Tables 5 and 6 in the Appendix). Most notable are two initiatives that began in the 
early 2000s: the 2002 Presidential Initiative on Cassava (PIC) and the creation of the Agricultural Transformation 
Agenda (ATA) in 2011 and its Cassava Transformation Agenda. Overwhelmingly, these initiatives have prioritized the 
 
12 In 2017, 29989 hectares of land was allocated for the production of certified seed. Of this, only 303 ha was allocated to cassava. 
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distribution of improved cassava varieties but have also pursued regulatory reforms in the seed system and created 
incentives to stimulate private investment in cassava processing.  
Among the more influential public programs aimed at accelerating the distribution of stems of improved cassava 
varieties to farmers was the Root and Tuber Expansion Program (RTEP). RTEP was initiated under the Presidential 
Initiative on Cassava, with the support of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and with 
counterpart contributions from Federal and participating state governments. Its main objective is to improve the 
productivity of cassava through the multiplication and dissemination of improved varieties to farmers.  
Under the presidential initiative, NRCRI established seed farms on 60 hectares to produce 24,000 bundles of breeder 
seed while RTEP set up seed farms on 80 hectares to generate 32,000 bundles of foundation stock, with an additional 
148 hectares planted by state ADPs to produce 59,000 bundles of certified stock. This was accompanied by the 
release of five improved varieties, the training of 500 extension agents, and the production of processing machinery 
such as cassava peelers, chipping machine, and manual harvester (Donkor et al., 2017). RTEP was responsible for the 
multiplication and distribution of approximately 250 million bundles of improved cassava variety stems to farmers 
under the presidential initiative (Mogues et al., 2008).  
The dissemination of these materials was partly carried out through Nigeria’s preexisting extension system, or what 
is referred to as the Agricultural Development Programs (ADPs). ADPs were set up in the 1980s under the Federal 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (FMARD) with World Bank support and were actively involved in the 
promotion and dissemination of good agricultural practices and improved varieties, especially during the 
presidential initiative. In recent years, however, the role of both RTEP and the ADPs in improved cassava variety 
dissemination has diminished with the withdrawal of World Bank support. Interviews conducted for this study 
suggest that farmer-to-extension agent ratios range from 1200 to as high as 8000 (Table 4). This is a high ratio 
considering that extension agents under the ADPs are responsible for providing advisory services on a wide range of 
crop and livestock issues, not just cassava seed production and cassava cultivation. 
Table 4: Distribution of extension agents, c. 2017/18 
State Current no. of extension agents Farmer-to-extension agent ratio  
Nasarawa 114  1: 8,000 
Kaduna 218  1: 5,000 
Niger 327  1: 4,000 
Abuja 97  1: 1,200 
Source: Authors. 
RTEP and the ADPs were followed by other initiatives. For example, the High-Quality Cassava Flour (HQCF) initiative 
aimed at substituting 10 percent of wheat flour in breadmaking and other value-addition processes with cassava 
flour, while the Cassava Bread Development Fund supported this initiative by providing funds to help increase 
demand for quality cassava as a feedstock for agroprocessing, which was expected to accelerate varietal turnover 
and increase quality seed use (FMARD, 2014; Asante-Pok; 2013). Similarly, the ATA distributed improved cassava 
varieties to farmers with a subsidy that reached up to 90 percent via the Growth Enhancement Scheme (GES), a 
targeted input subsidy program, while also advancing its Cassava Transformation Agenda through the promotion of 
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value-added processing for food and fuel, and employment and enterprise development in the value addition of 
cassava.  
These initiatives were preceded—or ran in parallel with, and sometimes in collaboration with—other projects dating 
back to the late 1980s. These projects were designed, in part or in whole, to distribute stems of improved cassava 
varieties to farmers. For example, multinational oil companies operating in Nigeria were engaged to fund the 
multiplication and distribution of TMS varieties to farmers, cooperative societies, women's associations, churches, 
and schools. Similarly, NGOs such as the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and international development organizations 
such as IFAD have also run projects to distribute improved varieties. In effect, these projects attempt to marry the 
work of cassava breeding programs with efforts to build quality assurance mechanisms and capacity among farmers 
and farmer groups. In the end, these programs have amounted to one-off initiatives with little impact on the 
development of sustainable seed systems, and subsequent efforts to integrate the dissemination of improved 
varieties with quality planting material are still nascent. While providing improved genetics to farmers represents an 
important contribution to efforts to achieve productivity growth, these programs placed far less emphasis on 
building mechanisms to provide farmers with quality cassava planting material, irrespective of genetic improvement. 
In fact, it might be argued that these programs might have hindered the development of formal cassava seed market 
and subsequent quality assurance mechanisms by promoting and financing the free distribution of stems on such a 
large scale that no regulatory mechanism could reasonably provide quality assurance service. 
More recently, NGOs, IITA and other partners have advanced an alternative model for improved cassava variety 
distribution in Nigeria: the Village Seed Entrepreneurs (VSE) model led by CRS and fostered through the USAID-
funded Unleashing the Power of Cassava (UPoCA) project, and several other donor-funded projects, most notably 
the SCSS (sustainable cassava seed systems) project led by CRS and funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation 
(BMGF) and an ongoing BMGF project “Building an Economically Sustainable Integrated Cassava Seed System” 
(BASICS).13 The model aims to address the entry barriers to high-quality seed producers by working with village-
based groups, essentially by supplying them with high-quality foundation seed (stems) of improved cassava varieties 
sourced from IITA and NRCRI, registering them with the NASC, training them in the production and marketing of 
certified stems, and helping them meet the costs and technical requirements of inspections. In Benue State, for 
example, more than 104 VSEs are engaged in the production and marketing of certified stems for improved varieties, 
with each producer allocating an average of 0.5 hectares of land to the production of two or more varieties. In 2017, 
VSEs allocated a total of 64 hectares to certified cassava seed production and produced 12,326 bundles of certified 
stems (NASC, 2018). 
Another IITA initiative—Cassava Seed Tracker—is a digital platform designed to support cassava seed producers in 
registering their fields with NASC, providing guidance on seed production standards and protocols, validating seed 
quality, and making information on quality seed providers available to farmers and the market. Further evaluation 
is required to determine whether these models are viable in the long term and at a scale sufficient to shift the quality 
 
13 BASICS is a 4-year project  which was led by the CGIAR Research Program on Roots, Tubes and Bananas, with IITA managing components on 
early generation seed with NRCRI and funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation that seeks to create a commercially viable private sector 
cassava seed system in Nigeria that is compliant with improved seed certification standards implemented by NASC. See https://www.iita.org/iita-
project/building-an-economically-sustainable-integrated-seed-system-cassava/ 
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of cassava seed production in Nigeria, or whether they will befall the same fate as other non-governmental 
initiatives. 
And ultimately, the success of these formal seed system initiatives and projects depends on their interaction with 
the informal sector, where most of the exchanges of stems occur. Unfortunately, these exchanges are difficult to 
quantify or characterize, resulting in insufficient information on the type of variety or quality of stems exchanged. 
But, as mentioned earlier, key informants to this study generally agree that farmer-to-farmer exchanges are the 
single most important means of obtaining both improved varieties and quality planting material for cassava in 
Nigeria. In this informal system, while the trade in cassava stems generally precludes any form of quality assurance, 
proxies—information about the reputation of the farmer providing or selling stems—play a key role in signaling 
quality to farmers. This should not be interpreted to suggest that these informal systems are fully detached from the 
more formal system. Informal seed producers and farmers do find ways of accessing materials from research centers 
or public extension and distribution programs at rates far higher than what might be conventionally believed. For 
example, using a DNA-fingerprinting approach, Wossen et al. (2019b) reported that 15 improved varieties had made 
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5.  FINDINGS 
5.1  APPROPRIATENESS OF THE POLICY AND REGULATORY SYSTEM  
This extensive description of Nigeria’s cassava seed system raises many questions. Possibly the most poignant 
question is whether the quality assurance system for cassava seed is at all appropriate. Assuming that the first-best 
line of defense against extant and emergent pests and diseases is host resistance, then the cassava seed system’s 
main challenge is to ensure that farmers have access to stems of improved varieties on a timely basis and at 
affordable prices. If we assume that replacement schedules for cassava stems extend up to 10 years because of the 
pest and disease resistance conferred by these newer varieties, then the potential size of the cassava seed market 
may be quite small; farmers only have to purchase replacement stems every decade.  
This replacement schedule reflects a fundamental characteristic of the cassava seed system found throughout our 
key informant interviews: most extension agents, farmers, and traders (i.e., commodity buyers and aggregators) do 
not dissociate high-quality cassava stems from improved cassava varieties. And with good reason. Wossen et al. 
(2019a) suggest yield gains of more than 80 percent are possible simply through varietal turnover, while MEDA 
(2016) suggest that the use of certified stems (irrespective of variety) offer yield gains of 8 to 20 percent. However, 
Kulakow et al. (2019) reported no significant difference in root yield and dry matter content resulting from the use 
of certified and uncertified stems of disease-resistant cassava varieties. 
Thus, the costs of building a formal and well-regulated seed market around a market with this unique characteristic 
may be uneconomical or even impractical. Instead, it may be the case that the informal systems hold a stronger 
position in this market, suggesting little need for a formal seed system, at least at the farmgate. Still, there remains 
a question about the speed at which newer varieties—especially varieties with abiotic stress-tolerance traits, 
resistance traits for emerging pests and diseases to avoid catastrophic dissemination of new pathogen, or nutritional 
and processing qualities—can be disseminated on a large scale to farmers in the future. And this does require some 
type of seed system. To be sure, the proliferation of TMS varieties in past eras suggests that there is a significant 
degree of interface between breeding programs, EGS production, stem multiplication, and distribution to farmers. 
But whether high-quality seed is at the core of this system remains to be seen—improved varieties may be the key 
driver. 
This then gives rise to a discussion on public investment priorities and the regulatory environment governing the 
seed system. Specifically, what type of public programs and quality assurance systems can (i): increase the overall 
supply of seed of improved varieties at any quality; (ii) increase demand for such seed among small-scale farmers; 
and (iii) provide profitable opportunities for seed producers? In this section, we reflect on the enabling policy 
environment, the functionality of the regulatory system, and alternative quality assurance systems, and relate these 
to the nature of both quality cassava seed supply and demand and the particular characteristics of cassava itself.  
Weak regulatory oversight and implementation 
Although there are well-established legal and regulatory frameworks governing the cassava seed system in Nigeria, 
most key informants—including regulators themselves—recognized that the existing quality assurance system is too 
stringent, too costly, and ultimately, ineffective in the case of cassava. Yet some key informants still maintain that 
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the rationale behind such as system remains unchanged: that the use of higher-quality planting material will reduce 
the spread of pest and disease pressure, increase yields and production, and contribute to national food security. 
Running contrary to this position is the belief of several key informants that the relationship between the quality 
stems and yield is not straightforward, and that host resistance (e.g., CMD) is a sufficient substitute for quality stems.  
At the heart of key informants’ criticisms of the regulatory system are observations that NASC rules and guidelines 
are not consistently adhered to in the inspection process. Stems are inspected visually with little or no sample 
collection or laboratory testing, and inspections are severely constrained by too few inspectors and facilities, limited 
technical capacity, long traveling distances between inspection sites, and prioritization of other crops such as maize 
and rice over cassava. As a result, several key informants suggest that inspections are merely a formality. This reality 
is the likely reason that many key informants—including several regulators themselves—expressed openness to a 
less stringent quality assurance regime for cassava.  
Unfortunately, this weak seed quality assurance system co-exists with a weak pest and disease surveillance system. 
Key informants explained that since seed certification considers only known pests and diseases, effective quarantine 
services are critical to monitor and contain the outbreak of new and emerging pathogens. Currently, NAQS 
undertakes emerging pathogen prevention at borders and through internal surveillance and global information 
exchanges with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and other global and regional entities. 
However, the system may be only marginally effective at controlling pathogens in both imported materials and 
exported materials: NAQS operates checkpoints and posts officers to each of Nigeria’s land, sea, and air crossings, 
but does not have the resources to monitor the country’s porous borders.  
Devolution and decentralization 
Further exacerbating this problem is the sheer size of Nigeria and the importance of devolution to the state level in 
the country’s political, administrative, and regulatory structure. Not surprisingly, regulators interviewed for this 
study argued that some aspects of the quality assurance system, specifically certification, should be a federal matter 
and that decentralization of the certification process to the state level would compromise seed quality. Yet other 
key informants suggested that state-level implementation of the existing seed quality assurance system is entirely 
feasible with training and guidance from federal agencies—not least because extension agents under the ADPs are 
directly involved in cassava seed production and inspection, and they fall under the purview of the states. As a result, 
inspection processes are—in practical terms—already decentralized to the state level in Nigeria, although the 
ultimate approval of certification remains with NASC at the federal level.  
Openness to regulatory reforms  
Several regulators interviewed for this study were keen to suggest opportunities for growth in the seed quality 
assurance system. These included new training in diagnostics, decentralization of the inspection process (but not 
certification, as noted above), securing facilities for molecular diagnostics, and using information and 
communications technologies to share data and information with stakeholders. These also included a shift in 
emphasis on certification to breeder and foundation seed level. NASC is also considering alternatives to reduce the 
cost of quality assurance following recent legislative developments that have opened the door for accredited third 
parties to conduct seed inspections. More importantly—and as a result of these recent legislative developments 
 
2 6  T H E  C A S S A V A  S E E D  S Y S T E M  I N  I N  N I G E R I A  
 
such as the 2019 seed act—the governing body in NASC will also be able to change regulations governing the seed 
system without parliamentary approval. This may provide the regulatory system with greater flexibility to pursue 
new opportunities, revise its rules and guidelines, and create a more responsive approach to seed quality 
assurance.14 
Concrete efforts to improve the supply of quality seed  
Still, many of these new or potential improvements in the regulatory system may just amount to “tinkering at the 
margins.” The larger issues around the cost of quality cassava seed production and the demand for quality cassava 
seed remain. This is where Nigeria’s formative experiences with programs such as RTEP, ADPs, and VSEs become 
important. In the absence of commercial cassava seed producers and a vibrant cassava seed market, extension 
agents under the ADPs or field staff working with RTEP and VSEs are likely to play a central role in the production of 
high-quality cassava seed. However, the number of extension agents and their capacity to provide relevant advisory 
services on cassava seed production is exceedingly limited. For example, individuals engaged in extension and 
advisory service provision that were interviewed for this study consider “improved varieties” as “quality seed” to be 
synonymous, suggesting that at a very fundamental level, the requisite understanding of a cassava seed system is 
not yet in place. Many of these same interviewees also suggest that they are engaged in the production of only a 
few selected improved cassava varieties under RTEP and are not given the resources to provide quality assurance in 
seed production. While RTEP is still actively involved in foundation seed production for a small number of selected 
cassava varieties, our informants suggested that the program is unlikely to continue playing a major role in the 
multiplication and dissemination of quality seed of improved varieties to farmers. VSEs may offer an alternative to 
RTEP and the ADPs. While VSEs are currently small in scale and reach, there is scope for improvement through, for 
example, the use of irrigation equipment to enable dry-season production, or off-season production to calibrate the 
supply with periods of peak demand, as suggested by several key informants.  
But despite the broad issues of scale and reach, VSEs themselves seem to suggest a degree of professionalization 
emerging in the cassava seed system. VSE members interviewed for this study seem to have a solid understanding 
of the issues underlying quality assurance in cassava stem production, for example, isolation distances between 
varieties, harvesting and postharvest practices, and general farm operations and management. Most VSEs report 
having written procedures and protocols documented in manuals for stem production, and most reported that they 
follow the instructions in these manuals. Most VSEs also report having been inspected at least three times per year 
by NASC and maintain records on key production indicators such as type and timing of fertilizer application; sowing, 
planting, and harvesting dates; inspection records; harvest quantities; and revenues from sales. While discussions 
with VSE members suggest that demand is not an issue—they can sell their stems without much difficulty—they are 
uncertain about future profitability and farmers’ willingness to pay price premiums on quality seed. 
These discussions suggest that VSEs have been able to charge relatively low prices—prices below what a 
considerable share of farmers were willing to pay—because of the implicit subsidy from donor project funding. 
Several key informants did report that VSEs generally discontinued the production of certified cassava stems when 
financial and in-kind support from the project ended. Further, there is little indication as to whether the current 
 
14 In the 2019 seed act, proposed changes in this regard include: 3rd party certification and increased penalties. 
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demand for stems produced and marketed by VSEs is driven by the need for quality stems or new varieties. Several 
key informants suggested that demand for quality stems emanates partly from demand for new varieties. All of 
these findings raise questions about the long-run feasibility of VSEs. 
 
5.2  PERSISTENT DISTORTIONS 
Furthermore, the success of VSEs—or any other commercial venture into cassava seed production and marketing—
will have to contend with regular distortions to the market. For instance, seed that would otherwise have not met 
the NASC standards could be distributed under the discretionary powers of NASC’s leadership for food security 
reasons. At times, this means large public distributions of free seed for emergencies, large program rollouts, or other 
purposes. While institutional procurement can provide opportunities for emerging seed entrepreneurs, the ability 
of such institutions to circumvent the regulatory system necessarily distorts the market. For example, according to 
several key informants, the GES program’s demand for certified seed without commensurate investment in 
production and inspection infrastructure and capabilities led to a situation where non-certified planting materials 
were regularly distributed to farmers as certified material. Other examples revealed opportunistic behavior by seed 
producers and traders who procure ordinary stems when government-funded initiatives and subsidy programs are 
announced for the large-scale multiplication and dissemination of improved varieties. These practices tend to push 
legitimate seed producers out of the market and away from institutional procurement opportunities and erode 
farmers’ trust in the market for stems altogether.  
Finally, many key informants suggested that the seed system is further distorted by corruption and mismanagement. 
Several key informants indicated that regulators themselves tended to distort the market by participating in the 
production, multiplication, and marketing of seed, in contravention of the law.15 Meanwhile, program leakages seem 
to be non-trivial in Nigeria. For example, in Nigeria’s long-standing fertilizer subsidy, an estimated $4.8 billion—
$162.5 million per year—was thought to have been lost to corruption over the program’s life (GrowAfrica, 2014). 
Similarly, the GES subsidy program that aimed to supply farmers with certified stems of improved cassava varieties 
cost Nigeria about $2.5 billion over five years, but without much evidence of reach (Wossen et al., 2018; Wossen et 
al., 2017a). These types of issues tend to crowd-out existing and potential quality seed producers from the market 
and render void any reasonable quality assurance system.  
5.3  OVERALL FINDINGS 
Overall findings suggest that the current policy and regulatory system governing Nigeria’s cassava seed system 
requires significant reforms. At a fundamental level, it is unclear whether the system is geared towards the 
dissemination of new cassava varieties, or certified cassava stems, or both. Regulators, extension agents, seed 
producers, and farmers themselves seem to have a mixed view of what the system should be aiming for. If the first-
best strategy for combating pests and diseases is host resistance, then the cassava seed system’s main challenge is 
to ensure that farmers have access to stems of improved varieties on a timely basis and at affordable prices. This 
means that the production and distribution of quality cassava seed to farmers is of less importance than the 
distribution of stems of improved varieties with trueness to type irrespective of quality. That said, breeders and 
 
15 This was identified as a major issue particularly for maize. For cassava, this kind of practice was mentioned as common during large-scale 
initiatives for stem distribution.  
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regulators argue that at upper levels in the seed system—where breeder and foundation seed are produced and 
distributed—the quality of planting material needs to be managed carefully, to avoid potentially catastrophic 
introduction of new pests and diseases for example. This then suggests a different role for NASC and other regulatory 
entities in Nigeria to focus attention on certification of early generation seed; it also suggests a different role for 
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6.  DISCUSSION: TOWARDS SENSIBLE POLICY AND REGULATION 
Overall, our findings suggest that there is considerable interest among certain stakeholders in the development of a 
formal cassava seed system in Nigeria through stronger policy and regulation, and with more effective 
implementation, monitoring, and enforcement. However, most stakeholders acknowledge that efforts to develop 
this capacity are likely to be costly and, ultimately, impractical for cassava. But if the supply of high-quality planting 
material is not the first-order problem in Nigeria, is public investment in stem multiplication and distribution through 
programs such as the RTEP and GES a viable and sustainable alternative? Experience to date suggests that these 
programs often amount to one-off initiatives, are susceptible to the distortions discussed above, and are quite 
limited in their ability to simultaneously accelerate varietal turnover, prevent the spread of pests and diseases, and 
supply quality stems at scale consistently. But if cassava seed distribution is a fundamentally spatially-constrained 
activity due to perishability and bulkiness, then some degree of localization—village-based or otherwise—is 
necessary. 
If the existing regulatory system is not practical or cost-effective, is it feasible to rely on a less stringent regulatory 
system that relies on seed producers to produce and market high-quality stems, primarily as a mechanism to 
disseminate improved varieties that confer biotic stress resistance, abiotic stress tolerance, and nutritional and 
processing traits? Based on the insights generated from our findings above, we propose a light-touch quality 
assurance system that recognizes the production, multiplication, and marketing of “clean” or medium-quality seed 
(𝛾𝜃𝐻 ≡ 𝜃𝑀 >  𝜃 using our earlier notation) of improved varieties. There is a subtle difference from the existing 
system that only recognizes the production and marketing of high-quality 𝜃𝐻 seed irrespective of variety and despite 
the widespread use of recycled 𝜃 seed. Below, we discuss the advantage of the light-touch quality assurance system 
focusing on the supply of quality seed, the cost of quality assurance, and participation by private actors.  
The light-touch system depends acutely on a continuous flow of new cassava varieties from the research system—
rapid introduction of new and differentiated products that can ultimately provide farmers with a wider choice of 
agronomic, stress-resistance, nutritional, and processing traits. In the light-touch system, we propose mandatory 
certification at the level of early generation seed production, relying on the professional capabilities of registered 
institutional or private EGS producers with proper laboratory and field procedures and accredited in-house staff to 
manage internal quality assurance. For commercial stem production, we propose that voluntary certification be 
made available for those seed producers that have cause to obtain certification, e.g., exporters, large commercial 
farms, or other private sector actors that can valorize certified stems in niche markets. A key requirement of 
voluntary certification is that these actors invest in internal quality assurance systems and in-house accredited staff 
to conduct inspections and maintain records for review by NASC and NASQ on a regular or ad hoc basis. This ensures 
a credible threat of external inspection. 
The core of the light-touch system remains the interface between EGS producers, on the one hand, and cooperatives, 
farmers’ organizations, out-growers, contract farmers, and VSEs, on the other hand. The latter group of seed 
producers would obtain foundation seed from EGS producers to produce clean seed for purchase by farmers. 
Necessarily, strategic public investment and producer subsidies would be required to develop seed producers’ 
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technical capacity, their internal inspection systems, their business planning and marketing skills, and their record-
keeping practices. External inspections would be required to ensure adherence to starter seed replacement 
schedules. But this should not imply the need for consumer subsidies to stimulate demand—ideally, marketing by 
seed producers would serve this purpose.  
Although this component of the light-touch system is partly reflected in current practice throughout Nigeria’s 
cassava seed system, it would nonetheless require a change in the law to provide official recognition. Furthermore, 
this light-touch system bears similarities to the quality declared seed (QDS) class introduced in Uganda recently. But 
in terms of practical implementation, minimum quality standards, and cost of regulations, the two systems differ. 
Specifically, the regulatory costs of ensuring quality in the QDS system are much higher (yearly inspection and 
certification costs) compared to the proposed light-touch system. Additionally, the light-touch system has the 
potential to create a vibrant private sector in upstream EGS production, pushed by the continuous release of new 
varieties and pulled by the growth of demand among downstream seed producers and farmers themselves. 
Otherwise, there will be only a marginal demand for clean seed.  
Such a system would also allow NASC to play a supportive role instead of a policing role, and would encourage 
decentralization of business registration, inspection, and seed certification. While quality assurance at the breeder 
and foundation seed level is expected to be performed by NASC or accredited third-party options, adherence to seed 
replacement schedules (preferably using the cassava seed tracker) can be done in a decentralized manner.  
While it is difficult to estimate the cost-effectiveness of the proposed light-touch system given available data, we 
can generate some suggestive evidence based on our findings and from prior research. First, we note that the cost 
of cassava seed certification (accounting for both internal and external inspection costs), based on data from VSEs 
in Nigeria and commercial seed entrepreneurs (CSEs) in Tanzania, is about 36 percent higher than the cost of 
producing “clean” cassava seed (MEDA, 2016). Second, this suggests that farmers’ willingness to pay for certified 
stems would have to be at least 36 percent higher than their willingness to pay for clean seed (i.e., assurance of true-
to-type). However, evidence from Tanzania and Uganda suggests that farmers are only willing to pay a price premium 
of between 8 and 25 percent for certified stems relative to uncertified stems (MEDA, 2016). The proposed light-
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7.  CONCLUSIONS 
This study presented an overview of the cassava seed system in Nigeria and proposes an alternative quality 
assurance system primarily as a mechanism to disseminate improved varieties. The study draws on prior research, 
key informant interviews and focus group discussions with seed system actors, and farm-level household data from 
the CMS as reported by Wossen et al. (2017a). The study documents the key actors, policies, regulations, and public 
programs that shape Nigeria’s cassava seed system and, specifically, their influence on the availability and 
affordability of quality stems.  
Several points emerge from this paper. First, the existing strict quality assurance system is costly, inefficient, and 
weakly enforced. Second, public programs to distribute improved varieties and distortions caused by public 
procurement and mismanagement have made the existing quality assurance system ineffective. Third, quality 
cassava seed and improved cassava varieties are functionally synonymous, implying that the seed system should be 
viewed almost exclusively as a channel through which to distribute high quality planting materials of improved 
varieties and, implicitly, not planting material of existing materials. 
Based on the insights generated from our findings, we proposed a light-touch regulation system that combines 
mandatory certification of early generation seed with capacity development and strict adherence to starter stem 
replacement schedules at the level of clean seed producer. Compared to the existing quality assurance system, this 
light-touch system may be more efficient in improving the supply of quality seed, addressing trait preference 
heterogeneity among consumers, and reducing the cost of quality assurance. The success of the light-touch system 
is, however, contingent on (a) a continuous flow of improved varieties that provide farmers with a menu of desirable 
traits: biotic stress resistance, abiotic stress tolerance, nutritional qualities, and processing qualities, and (b) public 
investment in both breeding and technical and enterprise capacity development of seed producers who are the 
primary interface with farmers. 
Finally, priorities for the research agenda moving forward should be to fill the gaps in our knowledge about the 
cassava seed system in Nigeria and beyond. This includes understanding farmers’ willingness to pay for quality 
cassava seed, the relationship between seed degeneration and yield under farmers’ conditions, and the commercial 
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9.  APPENDIX 
Table 5: Major cassava related policy/regulatory interventions 
Timeline 
(starting year) 
Policy/institutional interventions Major objectives 
 
1972 National Accelerated Food Production Programme 
(NAFPP) 
Increasing the production and productivity of cassava as a 
key food security crop. 
1975 The National Seed Service (NSS)  Establish the legal framework for a national seed system 
1976 National Root Crop Research Institute (NRCRI)  Mandated to undertake R&D for root crops, mainly for 
cassava  
1987 National Crop Varieties and Livestock Breeds Act 
(Decree no. 33 of 1987 
Established the Breeds Registration and Release 
Committee (NVRC) to oversee the variety release and 
registration process 
1985 Agricultural Development Project (ADP) Provision of extension services for promoting improved 
varieties.  
1992 National Agricultural Seed Act (Decree no. 72 of 
1992)  
Replaced NSS and updated the legal framework for a 
national seed system and key public agencies to govern 
and manage this system. 
2002 Presidential Initiative on Cassava (PIC) Improve cassava productivity, production, export earnings, 
and value chain development 
2002 Root and Tuber Expansion Program (RTEP) Improve cassava productivity and production through 
multiplication and dissemination of improved varieties to 
farmers. 
2002 The High-Quality Cassava Flour (HQCF) Initiative 
and the Cassava Bread Development Fund 
Substitute 10 percent of wheat flour with cassava flour in 
processed goods; fund value chain initiatives. 
2004 Presidential Committee on Cassava for Export 
Promotion 
Increased production, processing, packaging, and export of 
cassava and cassava products. 
2011 Cassava Transformation Agenda of the Agricultural 
Transformation Agenda (ATA) 
Improve the value addition of cassava to double 
productivity, generate employment, and increase farmer 
incomes from cassava. 
2016 Agricultural Promotion Policy (APP) Improve cassava productivity, production, seed system, 
and value chain development. 
Source: compiled by Authors based on Oparinde et al., 2016 and other literature 
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Table 6: Major cassava related projects 
Timeline 
(starting year) 
Policy/institutional interventions Major objectives 
1984 The National Coordinated Research on Cassava 
Project (NCRCP) 
The project coordinates the on-farm adaptive research on cassava by 
ADPs, research institutes, and universities across Nigeria. 
2001 The Rural Sector Enhancement Project (RUSEP)  Increasing the productivity and competitiveness of cassava. Improve 
and development of market-driven agricultural production to 
generate employment through the enhancement or creation of rural 
agricultural enterprises. 
2003 The Preemptive Management of Cassava Mosaic 
Disease Project (CMD) 
(a) Mitigate the impact of CMD and prevent its spread throughout 
Nigeria and West Africa; (b) increase cassava productivity by 
deploying high yielding cultivars and proven sustainable crop and 
soil management technologies; (c) promote the adoption of 
improved and profitable postharvest and processing technologies as 
well as new product development; (d) improve value addition to 
cassava through increased private-sector investment in production, 
processing, storage, and marketing; (e) increase incomes and 
livelihoods in rural areas by developing increased commercialization 
and effective and active market information acquisition and 
dissemination systems and (f) strengthen human and institutional 
capacity to produce, process, and market cassava efficiently. 
2004 Cassava Enterprise Development Project (CEDP)  Value addition to the cassava crop, mechanization, and cassava 
value chain development. Reduction of CMD through growing of 
released CMD-resistant varieties. Increased production and 
productivity of cassava using CMD-resistant varieties. The 
development and expansion of postharvest processing. CEDP 
focused on selected communities in eleven states of the southeast 
(Anambra, Ebonyi, Edo, Enugu, and Imo) and the south-south (Abia, 
Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, and Rivers) including the 
Niger Delta region (NDR). 
2006 Cassava Production, Processing and Marketing 
Project (CAADP) 
This project supported expansion and productivity enhancement in 
cassava through the multiplication of planting material and 
innovative cassava processing and marketing options. 
2007 West African Agricultural Productivity Project 
(WAAPP)  
The objective of WAAPP was to generate and disseminate improved 
technologies. As part of this project, improved cassava varieties, 
including vitamin A cassava were multiplied and disseminated in 
Nigeria 
2008 Unleashing the Power of Cassava in Response to 
Food Price Crisis (UPoCA) 
The purpose of the UPoCA project was to provide an adequate 
supply of cassava products at economically affordable prices through 
mass propagation of improved and high-yielding cassava varieties; 
promotion of farm gate and value-adding processing of cassava for 
food and markets; and training farmers in improved cassava 
production techniques.  
2010 Cassava Adding Value for Africa (C:AVA) project The objective of this project was developing value chains for High 
Quality Cassava Flour (HQCF) to improve the livelihoods and incomes 
of smallholder households and other value chain actors as direct 
beneficiaries, including women and disadvantaged groups. 
2012 Support to Agricultural Research for Development 
of Strategic Crops in Africa (SARD-SC) 
The project supported new variety development, promoted and 
disseminated improved cassava varieties, and enhanced the capacity 
of local institutions and value-chain actors. 
2013 Cassava Mechanisation and Agro-processing 
Project (CAMAP) 
The goal of CAMAP is to enhance cassava production 
and processing technologies for sustainable improvements 
in food security, incomes, and livelihoods for farmers, processors, 
and marketers in the cassava sector. In particular, it aims to improve 
cassava productivity by upgrading and expanding traditional 
planting, harvesting and processing techniques. 
2015 Building an Economically Sustainable, Integrated 
Seed System for Cassava in Nigeria (BASICS) 
The objective of this project is to develop a sustainable cassava seed 
system that is based on the commercial sale of cassava planting 
material that is produced with high-quality standards that are 
certified by the National Agricultural Seed Council (NASC).  
Source: compiled by Authors based on Oparinde et al., 2016 and other literature. 
 
 
 
